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This paper examines causes of the persistence of corruption among elected politicians
in democracies. We study a theoretical model of competition between two candidates
who diﬀer both in ability and popularity in a probabilistic voting setup. Each can-
didate proposes a tax rate and a public good level. The elected candidate’s ability
determines the cost of producing the public good. The budget constraint implies that
taxes collected must equal the sum of public good cost and the amount stolen by the
elected politician. We solve for the tax rates chosen by the candidates and how much
each candidate chooses to steal depending on his ability and popularity. We, then, an-
alyze the eﬀects of various commonly discussed reforms as potential ways of deterring
political corruption. We identify conditions under which (i) imposing tax rate limits,
(ii) increasing compensation of elected politicians, and (iii) raising legal penalties for
corruption, will increase corruption and/or reduce the social welfare. Under certain
conditions, the reforms that will reduce corruption will not be supported by either
corrupt or honest politicians.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
According to a survey conducted by the Open Society Institute, three-fourths of Lithua-
nians believe that either most or all of the politicians in their country are corrupt (The
New York Times, November, 7, 2002). Corrupt politicians, as citizens of many other
countries would agree, exist beyond the borders of Lithuania as well. John Randolph
complained1 that his Congressional colleague, Henry Clay, “... is so brilliant, so capa-
ble, and yet so corrupt that like a rotten mackerel in the moonlight, he both shines
and stinks”. Depending on the strength of the law enforcement, a politician as well
as anyone else may decide to commit a corrupt act. The advantage of democracy over
other forms of government is that any politician who wants to be reelected incorporates
the eﬀect of his actions on his support from the electorate in subsequent elections. Yet,
given voters’ dislike of corruption and politicians’ desire for reelection, it seems para-
doxical that corrupt politicians not only survive in politics, but also win repeatedly. In
light of recent ﬁndings on the negative impact of corruption on economic growth, the
need to understand the role of political institutions in deterring corruption is especially
crucial. In this paper we examine conditions under which politicians engage in cor-
rupt behavior, analyze the eﬀectiveness of some commonly discussed anti-corruption
reforms, and discuss willingness of politicians to support such reforms.
The argument for the persistence of corruption in democracy is based on the nature
of political competition. We formalize the idea that candidates can be diﬀerentiated
from one another in terms of dimensions other than corruption, e.g., with respect
to their ability or popularity with voters. A candidate that is more able or popular
than his rival can engage in greater corruption and still remain competitive. This
is captured by a model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting, in which
voters evaluate candidates in terms of the policies they oﬀer, as well as their intrinsic
loyalties. Loyalties may be subject to random, unpredictable swings, implying that
even candidates identical in ability and ex ante popularity can aﬀord to engage in
corruption and yet be reelected with positive probability. In the model, candidates
propose ﬁscal policy platforms, where the amount they steal from the public treasury is
implicitly deﬁned by the diﬀerence between revenues and public good costs. Candidates
thus choose the amount they steal along with the tax rates they propose. Corruption
1Quoted in Ehrenhalt [2002].
1in equilibrium is increasing in heterogeneity among candidates with respect to their
popularity, and in the extent of randomness in voter loyalties.
An analogy to the context of price competition between two ﬁrms helps explain this
point. Consider two ﬁrms that select price and quality of their respective products, in a
context where there is uncertainty about their relative demands. Bertrand competition
will then allow ﬁrms to price above cost and select suboptimal qualities.
Models of corruption based on competition with probabilistic voting were consid-
ered earlier by Brennan and Buchanan [1980], Polo [1998] and Persson and Tabellini
[2000]. Our model extends and generalizes these models in a variety of directions. In
comparison with Brennan and Buchanan, for instance, theft is not the only source of
rents for elected oﬃcials. Power (ego-rents) may be valued for its own sake. Besides,
salaries and perquisites of oﬃce represent a source of legal rents that represent a pol-
icy parameter. This diﬀerence in assumptions about the motivation of politicians has
important implications for the eﬀects of diﬀerent kinds of policies on corruption and
welfare.
Consider the eﬀects of constitutional constraints on tax rates that Brennan and
Buchanan [1980] promote as instruments for reducing corruption. Their argument is
based on the assumption of a (Leviathan) government, which faces no competition and
for whom theft constitutes the sole source of rents. We investigate the eﬀects of tax
constraints in a setting with duopolistic competition and multiple sources of rents. We
ﬁnd that tax constraints are eﬀective in the case where competing candidates are ex
ante identical, but may be counterproductive when they are not.
The analogy with market competition is again helpful in explaining this. The
Brennan-Buchanan theory is analogous to a monopolist who selects minimum quality
and charges the highest price that leaves the buyer indiﬀerent between buying the
good and not. In such case, imposing a price ceiling raises consumer welfare. Whether
imposing a price ceiling in a duopoly will result in higher consumer welfare is, however,
more complicated. In a duopoly, the quality provided by a ﬁrm is not necessarily at the
minimum level. Forcing ﬁrms to lower their price may result in a proportional reduction
in quality, which is not necessarily welfare-increasing. We ﬁnd that when both ﬁrms
(resp. candidates) are identical and maximize proﬁts (resp. are corrupt), a price ceiling
(tax rate constraint) slightly lower than the equilibrium is welfare-increasing if and only
if the utility from quality ( resp. public good) is strictly concave. In order to calculate
2the appropriate constraints, however, drafters of a constitution will require information
that is privately held by the (current and future) candidates, such as how able and
honest they are. And when the candidates are not identical, the constraints may have
t h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect of raising corruption and lowering welfare. In equilibrium, a less
popular candidate may diﬀerentiate himself by providing higher public good, ﬁnanced
by higher tax rates and less corruption. A tax rate constraint can aﬀect the policy of
this candidate, resulting in a higher competitive advantage for the more popular and
corrupt candidate. This will encourage the latter to become more corrupt.
A commonly proposed reform to reduce the illegal appropriation of public funds is to
increase the legal compensations of politicians, e.g., as suggested by Becker and Stigler
[1974]. In the market analogy, this corresponds to a prize (ﬁnanced by consumers) given
to the ﬁrm with the highest sales. In that case, a ﬁrm has incentives to increase its sales,
which can be accomplished by proposing a better price-quality ratio, i.e., lowering the
level of corruption. Increasing the wage is, however, costly, since customers eventually
ﬁnance the wage bill. We ﬁnd that when candidates are identical and there are no legal
incentives for corruption the beneﬁt of wage increase (lower corruption) justiﬁes the
cost. But in the presence of legal penalties, this is not always so. The distributional
impact of wage increases is also diﬀerent from those of constitutional tax constraints,
i.e., most of the burden of the former is borne primarily by the rich, the latter by the
poor.
When legal incentives are very strong (a high probability of getting caught and
resultant harsh penalties), a candidate will remain honest no matter what the electoral
incentives. When legal incentives are weaker, the political competition game has mul-
tiple (two) equilibria: either both candidates stay honest or both steal. Since the legal
incentives reduce the expected rents from the oﬃce, a small increase in legal penalties
can raise corruption and lower welfare.
Finally, we consider the incentives of candidates to propose an anti-corruption re-
form. When both candidates are corrupt, it is not surprising that they would have no
interest in proposing a reform that would eliminate some of their rents. We demonstrate
that even an honest candidate may not want to support such a reform if his opponent
is corrupt, since it removes an important source of his competitive advantage.
In summary, our model contributes to an understanding of persistence of corruption
in democracies in a variety of ways. Political corruption may stem from factors that are
3beyond the control of constitution designers, such as voter loyalty and candidate het-
erogeneity. Many reforms commonly suggested (such as constitutional tax constraints,
and legal and salary reforms) may increase corruption. And even when there exists a
welfare improving reform that is supported by electorate, it may not be proposed by
any of the politicians competing for public oﬃce.
Section 2 presents the model without law enforcement. In section 3, we prove ex-
istence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium. In section 3 we also present comparative
statics, an example using quasilinear utility function, and a discussion and generaliza-
tion of results from the literature. In section 4, we discuss constitutional constraints
on tax rates. In section 5, we introduce law enforcement, and then discuss the two
reforms: higher wages and higher legal penalties. At the end of section 5 we com-
pare the two reforms (constitutional constraints on tax rates and higher wages) from
a distributional point. In Section 6, we present other approaches to model the agency
problem in politics. We discuss that the approach we follow is better in evaluating dif-
ferent reforms, since it models strategic interaction between candidates. In Section 7,
we discuss the extensions of the model and conclude. Most of the proofs are presented
in the Appendix.
2T h e M o d e l .
Let us imagine a society where each voter i has income Yi, out of which he pays an
income tax at ﬂat rate τ and consumes the rest. The income in society is distributed
over [Ymin,Y max]w i t hm e a s u r eµ(Yi). The size of the population, N, and the average
income y = 1
N
R
Yidµ(Yi) are both normalized to one. There are two political agents
(candidates) who compete for votes. Candidate j ∈ {1,2} chooses a policy platform,
i.e., promises a tax rate, τj, and a per capita public good level, Gj. He implements the
promised policy platform when he wins the election.
Voters.
Each voter i has preferences over his consumption of the private good, ci =( 1 −τ)Yi,
and the public good, G. Preferences over consumption are represented by a separable
utility function
U(ci,G)= I(ci)+ H(G),
where I() and H() are two strictly increasing, C2, and concave functions from R+
4to R with at least one of them being strictly concave. In order to ensure interior
outcomes we assume
Assumption (no extreme platforms): The marginal utility of consumption con-
verges to inﬁnity as the good consumed goes to zero, i.e., limc↓0 I0(c)=∞, limG↓0 H0(G)=
∞.
The voters have preferences over the characteristics of political agents as well. The





i,G j)+( j − 1)ξi2. (1)
We assume sincere voting: Voter i votes for candidate j when U
j
i >Uk




then each candidate gets the vote with equal chance.
Candidates.
Following the probabilistic voting literature, we assume that ξi2 can be written
as b + b2 + bi2, where b is the electorate’s average bias in favor of candidate 2 which
is known ex ante. A positive (negative) b means candidate 2 is more (less) popular.
From the candidates’ point of view, the other terms in voter preferences, b2 and bi2,
are random variables uniformly distributed on (respectively) [−1
2g , 1
2g]a n d[ −1
2f , 1
2f]. The
ﬁrst term, b2, reﬂects uncertainty about a correlated preference shock, while the second
term, bi2, reﬂects an idiosyncratic shock on individual i’s preferences. We assume
that these preference shocks are statistically independent of each other and of b, i.e.,
E[b2 | b,bi2]=0a n dE[bi2 | b,b2]=0 .
Both candidates run for the same position, which we call the position of leader. The
leader produces the public good from the available public funds using a technology, that
depends on his ability. The ability levels of each candidate, aj, can be diﬀerent. The
higher is the ability of the leader, the lower is the cost of producing any level of public
good. The available public funds that can be used by the leader in the production of
public good is equal to collected tax revenues minus the salary of the leader, (denoted
by w), a n da na m o u n tt h a th ec h o o s e st os t e a l .L e tSj denote the public funds stolen.
The per capita public good delivered when candidate j is the leader is
Gj = aj(τj − w − Sj). (2)








of feasible policy platforms for a candidate is any tax rate from the interval [w,1] and
any level of stealing that provides at least a zero public good level. Then the strategy
space of candidate j is
Σj = {(τj,S j):τj ∈ [w,1] and Sj ∈ [0,τj − w]}, a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 .
When a candidate wins the election, he is going to get legal rents and will have
access illegal rents. In addition to salary, legal rents include ego rents, E.2 Following
the corruption literature, we assume that there are deadweight losses from illegal rents:
when the leader diverts a dollar from the public budget, a fraction 1−Lj will be wasted,
so the leader will appropriate only Lj < 1. This assumption, known as “leakage” or
“deadweight loss of corruption” in the literature, reﬂects the possibility that the leader
should share the illegal rents with some of his political supporters or with corrupt
bureaucrats, or that there is a moral cost of stealing. When the leader is what Rose-
Ackerman [2001] calls “pathologically honest,” we have Lj =0 .
We assume that candidates are expected rent maximizers. The rents that candidate j
receives conditional on being elected are
2We consider changes in the wage as a possible way to reduce the politician’s incentives to steal;
hence, we want to seperate rents into ego rents, rents that can not be (at least easily) designed and
wages, rents that can be perfectly controlled, at the cost of higher taxes.
6Rj(Sj)=w + E + LjSj. (3)






i,G j) − U(ck
i ,G k)] + Pj], (4)
where Pj =2 ( j − 3
2)b is the eﬀect of ex-ante popularity advantage of candidate j
and the expectation is taken with respect to µ. Note that ρj can also be written as a
function of (τj,S j,τk,S k), i.e.,
ρj = 1
2 +g[E[U((1−τj)Yi,a j(τj −w −Sj))−U((1−τk)Yi,a j(τk −w −Sk)]+Pj].
2.1 Agency Problem.
Let us normalize the outside option for candidates to zero. Then candidate j selects a
policy platform4 to maximize his expected rents:
max
(τj,Sj)∈Σj
ρj(τj,S j,τk,S k)Rj(Sj). (5)
Let (τ∗
j,S∗
j),j=1 ,2 denote a Nash equilibrium:
(τ∗
j,S∗
j) ∈ argmax ρj(τj,S j,τ∗
k,S∗
k)Rj(Sj). (6)
The voters’ expected (utilitarian) welfare, E[W], as a function of policy platforms
and popularity of each candidate is5




The policy platform, (τ0
j,S0
j), which maximizes E[W] when adopted by candidate
j will be referred as the ﬁrst-best policy platform for candidate j. It is easy to check
that the ﬁrst best policy platform for candidate j ∈ {1,2} involves zero corruption
and a tax rate which maximizes E[Ui((1 − τj)Yi,G j(τj,0))], the average utility of the
electorate.6 The optimality of zero corruption/shirking is intuitive: Given the tax rate,
less stealing means higher public goods delivered.
3See Appendix.
4From the candidate’s point of view (τj,G j)a n d( τj,S j) are interchangeable.
5See Appendix.
6Thus, the ﬁrst-best tax rate is τ
0
j =a r gm a x τj∈[w,1] E[Ui((1−τj)Yi,a j(τj −w))] and the ﬁrst-best







Conditional on Sj,τk,S k, candidate j selects τj to maximize ρj. This implies (given
(4)) that he selects τj to maximize average voter utility conditional on Sj. So, in our
model the agency problem exists, if at all, in only one dimension, i.e., stealing. This
is due to the assumptions that candidates are rent-maximizing, that voters are well
informed, and that there are no special interest lobbies. This observation also simpliﬁes
the analysis, since the strategy space reduce to the level of stealing alone.
To see when we have an agency problem, we need to consider the ﬁrst order con-








should be less than or equal to zero. The marginal utility of S for candidate j is
equal to a weighted average of two marginal gains: (i) the average marginal disutility
of voters from corruption weighted by gRj and (ii) the marginal utility from a stolen
dollar conditional on being elected, weighted by the probability of winning election, ρj.
If (8) is always negative, reducing Sj makes the candidate better oﬀ. Then candidate
sets Sj =0 , and there is no agency problem. When (8) is positive at Sj =0 , then
candidate j keeps stealing until (8) becomes zero.7 Let s0
j(Sk)d e n o t et h eb e s tr e s p o n s e




∂Sk ≥ 0, The best response functions intersect only once. We
therefore obtain
Theorem 1 There exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the political com-
petition game.
Depending on the parameters the outcome is (i) overall corruption (both candidates
steal), (ii) partial corruption (only one candidate steal), or (iii) no corruption (both
candidates oﬀer policies that maximize voters’ welfare). Figure 2 describes four diﬀerent
subsets of parameters that give rise to these diﬀerent outcomes. In graphs (a) and (c)
both candidates steal. Only Candidate 1 steals in (b). In (d) none of them steals. The
7We show in the appendix that (8) is strictly decreasing in Sj.
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Figure 2:
thick curve is s0
1 (S2). Note that to determine the outcome of the game, we need to
know (i) whether s0
j(0) > 0o rn o t ,a n d( i i )i fs0
j(0) = 0 for at least one candidate, then
whether Sj <s 0
j(0) or not, where Sj =i n f{Sj | s0
k(Sj) > 0}.
A natural question to ask is which subset of parameters gives rise to which of the
graphs in Figure 2. We do not have closed form solutions for those sets. Incorporated
into our model I(.)a n dH(.) are also parts of the parameter space, which makes the
conditions particularly messy, (see the Appendix). To be able to convey the intuition
about which parameters increase/decrease incentives to be corrupt, one can either (i)
choose a “nice” functional form for U, where these conditions become more tractable,
or (ii) look at the comparative statics. We do both.
93.1 An Example: Quasilinear Utility.
Assume8 that U = c +2 θ
√
G, then candidate j0s best response to candidate k is
s0








where Aj = θ2(aj −ak)+Pj is the comparative advantage that the candidate j has
and K0
j = W+E
Lj . The last term is equal to the illegal rents that are payoﬀ equivalent
to legal rents, i.e., the amount of corrupt rents when stolen that would yield the same
income as legal rents.9 To rule out policy platforms that involve zero consumption
when U = c+H(G), the overall uncertainty and the relative advantage of a candidate
should not be too high and/or the legal rents should not be too low.10












Lk) for all j ∈ {1,2} iﬀ
-either 1
4g+ θ2(aj − ak)+2 (1
2 − j)b − W+E
Lj > 0 for all j ∈ {1,2}
-or 1
4g+ θ2(aj0 − ak)+2 ( 1
2 − j0)b + W+E
Lj0 > 0f o ro n l yj0 ∈ {1,2} but we have













2Lj > 0,S k =0i ﬀ 1
4g+ θ2(aj0 − ak)+2 (1
2 −
j0)b+ W+E









2 =0i ﬀ 1
4g+ θ2(aj − ak)+2 (1
2 − j)b − W+E
Lj ≤ 0 for all j ∈ {1,2}.
As both Polo[1998] and Persson and Tabellini [2000] note, the quasilinear utility
8Note that quasilinear form does not satisfy our assumption on inﬁnite marginal utility at zero
zorruption. Since it simpliﬁes calculations considerably and earlier studies, both Polo [1998] and Persson
and Tabellini [2000] use quasilienar form, we provide that example. On the other hand the policy
platforms proposed by candidates may involve 100% taxes when utility is quasilinear (see Appendix






j, then the proportion of illegal rents in candidate j
0s income is larger than the
proportion of legal rents.
10It is easy to calculate that a 100% tax rate is not part of candidate j









We need a weaker condition for zero private corruption not to be an equilibrium, although under
this condition, it may still be a best response to some policy platform. For positive private good
consumption in equilibrium, the parameters should satisfy,
3
4gy + θ






2 for both j ∈ {1,2}.
10function implies that the eﬀects of higher corruption will be higher tax rates, while
public good levels are always ﬁrst-best. Also, the slope of the reaction function that
we ﬁnd above is independent of the parameters of the model. Both of those results
are driven by the special functional form. In Appendix, we show how the eﬀect of
corruption on tax rates and public good levels diﬀer for diﬀerent utility functions. For
diﬀerent utility functions, the slope of reaction function is not necessarily independent
of parameters of the model either. However even when we consider diﬀerent utility
functions, the direction of comparative statics does not change. In the next section we
present comparative statics again for general U.
3.2 Comparative statics and relation to previous literature.
Let us calculate the eﬀect of a small change in one of the parameters, g,b,E,a on the
reaction functions. Then, we show that the results of previous studies can be considered
as applications of those comparative statics in special environments.
Lemma 1 Consider Sk such that candidate j’s best response is to steal, (s0
j(Sk) > 0).
Any of the following would cause j to steal more, (shift s0
j(Sk) to the right):
- an increase in the uncertainty about popularity, 1
g,
- an increase in the popularity of candidate, 2(3
2 − j)b,
- a decrease in the ability of the rival candidate, ak, and
- a decrease in ego rents, E.
Proof. When s0
j(Sk) > 0, we have (8)=0. Then applying the implicit function
theorem, the above results are obtained.
Note that a shift in the reaction function does not always imply a change in the
equilibrium. For instance, for Graph (d) in Figure 2, a small change in any of the
parameters has no eﬀect on the outcome, i.e., the candidates who stay honest will
not start to steal after the uncertainty increases a little bit. On the other hand if a
candidate was stealing in the equilibrium, higher uncertainty will make him steal more.
The compaartive statics are monotone: after a suﬃciently large increase in uncertainty,
a candidate who was honest (but not pathologically) will start stealing.
Let us now examine how the comparative statics in Lemma 1 relates to previous
literature on agency problem in politics. Brennan and Buchanan [1980], in their pio-
neering study of political economy of taxation, consider the state, for most part, as a
11dictator who uses his powers to further his own private interest and does not face any
political competition. To justify that assumption, they begin with an election example:
two competing politicians oﬀer policies on how to distribute $300 among three voters.
When there is uncertainty on vote shares, they claim that “each party would ratio-
nally appropriate some of the $300, even where the other party did not”(Brennan and
Buchanan [1980], p 22). After noting that when the aggregate vote shares are stochas-
tic, “the multi-party competition and more importantly the simultaneous announce-
ment of policies is not fully constraining as Downs claims,” Brennan and Buchanan
build their theory of “the foundations of a ﬁscal constitution.” However, their conclu-
sion that candidates necessarily steal, is an outcome of speciﬁc assumption that there
are no legal rents.
Theorem 2 (Brennan and Buchanan [1983], Polo [1998]) Suppose that candi-
dates are identical, (a1 = a2,b=0 ) , are not pathalogically honest, (L>0), and there
are no legal rents, (W = E =0 ) . If there is overall uncertainty, (1
g > 0), then Sj > 0
in equilibrium.






When there are no legal rents, the only source of rents is corruption. Hence there
is no point of winning the election if a candidate cannot acquire any illegal rents, i.e.,
the weight on voters’ disutility on corruption is zero when Sj is zero. The marginal
utility of corruption for candidate j is Lρj, which is strictly positive when L>0. Thus
we always have s0
j(0) > 0 then, the unique equilibrium outcome is corruption by both
candidates.
As Theorems 3 and 4 reveal, uncertainty about the outcome of elections is neither
necessary nor suﬃcient for corruption to occur. The eﬀect of uncertainty on electoral
incentives of a candidate can be seen from (8): The larger the uncertainty, the smaller
g, and the less important the policy issues for winning the elections, hence less weight
on voters’ welfare. Theorem 1 does not require a speciﬁc utility function. Also, as far
as there are no legal rents, Theorem 1 would hold even if candidates were not identical.
Polo [1998] does not mention the work by Brennan and Buchanan [1980], but his
model does provide a well speciﬁed environment for the phenomenon ﬁrst discussed by
them. In Polo, the process that leads to uncertainty in vote shares, probabilistic voting,
12is explicitly modelled. The policy is two dimensional, U(ciG)=ci + H(G)w h e r eH(.)
is strictly concave. As Brennan and Buchanan, Polo also assumes expected rent max-
imizing candidates and no legal rents. In Polo’s model, popularity diﬀerences among
candidates are allowed. He ﬁnds that such diﬀerences are important for candidate’s
incentives to steal.
Theorem 3 (Polo [1998]) Suppose that there is no ability diﬀerence between the
candidates, (a1 = a2), and no overall uncertainty about candidate preferences, (1
g =
0). If one candidate is more popular than the other, (b6=0 ) , then (only the) popular
candidate will steal.
Proof. When 1
g =0 , there is no uncertainty about the winner of an election. The
candidate who proposes a policy platform that provides higher utility to the median
voter wins the election for certain. Suppose that both candidates adopt the (identical)
policy platform that is most preferred by median voter. Then the more popular can-
didate, say k,w i l lw i n .B u th ec o u l da ﬀord to steal a little and increase Rk without
risking his victory in elections, i.e. without lowering ρk. Since that would increase his
expected rents, he will steal in the equilibrium.11
When, in addition to popularity advantage there is uncertainty about voter loyalty
swings, the incentives to steal increase even further. The intuition for the eﬀect of
greater popularity is that it permits that candidate to steal more without making
himself inferior to another candidate. This helps explain the paradox that pointed
out by Kurer [2001] as well as by many others, i.e., some corrupt politicians are also
quite popular. Our model would explain this by reversing the causality implicit in
the expression. Politicians are not popular because they are corrupt, but rather that
popular politicians can aﬀord to be corrupt.
Persson and Tabellini [2000] discuss the agency problem in politics employing a
probabilistic voting model and a quasilinear utility function as Polo [1998] but they
consider ego rents as well.
Theorem 4 (Persson and Tabellini [2000]) Suppose that U = c + H (G),c a n -
didates are identical, (a1 = a2 and b =0 ) , there is no wage, but there are ego rents
coming from the oﬃce, (E>0). Then, there is political corruption iﬀ E> L
2g.
11Note that we need some discreteness in the strategy space, otherwise the optimum best response,
and the equilibrium do not exist.
13Proof. When both candidates are identical, the equilibrium (which is unique by
Theorem 1) is symmetric, so ρj = 1













, then (8) is negative at Sj =0 , i.e., s0
j(0) < 0f o r
both candidates. Then S∗
1 = S∗
2 = 0 is (the unique) equilibrium. For the special case





The result that when ego rents are high enough, there exists an equilibrium without
corruption applies for any utility function as far as marginal utility from public good is
strictly positive. That result can be extended to heterogeneous candidates: Whenever
the ego rents are suﬃciently high and there is uncertainty about voter loyalty, 1
g > 0,
both candidates choose not to steal, despite any advantage that one may have over the
other.
We have shown which factors lead to political corruption. Now we will address
what can be done about it.
4 Constitutional constraints as anticorruption reform.
Brennan and Buchanan [1980] discuss how an individual member of society who de-
cides behind a “veil of ignorance” would like to impose constraints on the political
decision-making process or on the domain of the political outcomes to maximize the
expected utility of his future selves. As a way to reduce political corruption, we con-
sider constitutional constraints on tax rates as discussed in chapter 10 of Brennan and
Buchanan [1980].12
In previous section we ﬁnd that aggregate uncertainty does not necessarily lead
to political corruption. Our point in this section is that even when it does lead to
corruption in democracies, proposed remedies ( constitutional constraints) should be
discussed in a model of political competition, not using a model of Leviathan. The
following is an attempt in that direction.
Let us ﬁrst assume that the parameters of the model are such that in equilibrium
at least one politician steals, so electoral incentives are not enough to deter political
corruption. Now we can study how the constitutional constraints interact with electoral
incentives.
12An example is the Proposition 13, which was approved by voters in California in 1978. It restricts
the tax on real property to 1 percent of market value.
14Proposition 5 It is impossible to implement the ﬁr s tb e s tp o l i c yp l a t f o r m ,(τ0
j,G 0
j)
through imposing a tax rate constraint on candidate j.
Proof. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to taxes in a Nash equilibrium
gRj
∂E[Ui((1 − τj)Yi,a j(τj − W − Sj))]
∂τj
− λj =0 ,
gRj
∂E[Ui((1 − τj)Yi,a j(τj − W − Sj))]
∂Sj
+( L − pv)ρj ≤ 0,
where λj is a Kuhn-Tucker multiplier satisfying λj(τj − τ)=0 .
Suppose there exists a τ that implements the ﬁrst best. Then λj > 0, the shadow
value of constraint is positive and is equal to the expected marginal utility of electorate
with respect to tax rate. But in a ﬁrst-best this should equal zero. Contradiction.
T h ef a c tt h a tt a xr a t ec o n s t r a i n t sc a n n o ti m p l e m e n tt h eﬁr s tb e s td o e sn o tm e a n
that they are useless. It simply means that these constraints may provide a beneﬁt,
yet they have a cost as well. Our second question is about the second-best: When does
a tax rate constraint increase voters welfare in a society with political corruption?
Let us consider a tax rate constraint that is marginally less than the equilibrium tax
rates without the constraint. The eﬀect of a tax rate constraint, τ, that is inﬁnitesimally
smaller than τ∗
j on voters utility from candidate j can be approximated as the sum of
















At an interior Nash equilibrium, the direct eﬀect is zero, so only the indirect eﬀect









gRa2H00(G) − LaH0 (G)
. (9)
When H(.) is strictly concave (9) is larger than zero. This implies:
Proposition 6 Whenever H(G) is strictly concave in a neighborhood of G∗,a n db o t h
candidates are identical and corrupt, a constitutional constraint that enforces both can-
didates to oﬀer a tax rate that is slightly lower than τ∗ is corruption reducing and
welfare-improving.
15The intuition is that tax rate constraints lower G, raise marginal utility of public
good. This increases the voters’ disutility from corruption. Hence the marginal utility
of stealing for a candidate is lower. Contrast to the Laﬀer curve argument for tax limits
in Brennan and Buchanan [1980]. The Leviathan taxes its subjects up to a point such
that increasing tax rates does not increase tax revenues anymore. It follows from the
assumption of monopoly power of the politician. Our argument incorporates eﬀect of
political competition.
So far we have discussed identical candidates. But what if they are not? Whenever
two candidates propose diﬀerent tax rates in the equilibrium, the one who proposes
the higher tax rate can be targeted by a constitutional limit. This is eﬀective if the
corrupt candidate selects a higher tax rate. But equilibrium may involve the opposite.
Consider the quasilinear utility function
U = ci +2
√
G
with a1 =0 .36,a 2 =0 .30,b=0 .08,g=2 5 ,L 1 = L2 =0 .8 and that there are no legal
rents13,w = E = 0. In the equilibrium the ﬁrst candidate proposes a tax rate of 36%
and the second candidate proposes 32% percent taxes. The public good levels that they
propose are G1 =( 0 .36)2, and G2 =( 0 .30)2. Only the second candidate steals. Any
tax rate constraint higher than 32 percent makes voters (and honest candidate) worse
oﬀ. It will induce candidate 1 to propose a platform that provides less utility to voters
which increases Candidate 2’s incentives to steal even further. A tax rate constraint
that is less than 32 percent does not work either. For, when the tax rate constraint is 32
percent, Candidate 2 is stealing more than what he stole when there was no constraint.
Candidate 2 will reduce the amount he steals back to 2 percent, what he stole without
the constraint, when the tax rate constraint is about 15 percent,14 τ =0 .15. Since
Candidate 1, who, in the ﬁrst-best, should produce public good with 36 percent of
total income, is forced to use 15 percent of total income, the welfare loss due to that
is much more than the welfare loss due to Candidate 2’s theft. Intuitively, candidate 2
steals because of his popularity advantage. The other candidate is more able and thus
13To assume that the legal rents are small would do it as well, here we follow Brennan and Buchanan






τ−0.02 +0 .5+2 5∗ [0.08 + 2(
p
0.3 ∗ (τ − 0.02) −
√
0.36 ∗ τ)] = 0
is τ =0 .15203.
16attempts to deliver higher public good, ﬁnanced by higher taxes. Imposing tax rate
constraints that bind for the honest candidate, makes popularity advantage even more
important, allowing the corrupt candidate to steal even more.
Accordingly when candidates are not identical, tax rate constraints are useful only
when the candidate who proposes larger tax rates is corrupt.
In our model, we can calculate the cost and beneﬁt of constraints and the optimal
constraint, as well as the necessary information to set the optimal constraint. Below
we calculate the optimal tax rate constraints for U = c+2θ
√
G when both candidates
are identical and corrupt.
Lemma 2 When U = c +2 θ
√
G and candidates are identical (and corrupt), the tax
rate constraint that maximizes voters’ expected welfare is τ = τo + S∗ − 1
8θ2g2a.
The above lemma demonstrates that when both candidates are identical and cor-
rupt, drafters of constitution can set an optimal tax limit. It may not eliminate cor-
ruption totally. For example if S∗ = 1
2g + W+E
L > 1
8θ2g2a, then even under the best tax
rate constraint the candidates keep stealing, and the tax rate is higher than the ﬁrst
best tax rate.
Consider the necessary information required to set the optimal tax rate constraint.
Suppose that the writers of constitution know both U and that all future candidates
are going to be identical and corrupt. Are they able to set the correct constraints with
this information? The answer is no. The optimal tax rate constraints in a democratic
society depends on the ethics and ability levels of all future candidates as well. A quote
from Hume in Brennan and Buchanan [1980] (also common in works by scholars from
Virginia school of public choice) —
“in contriving any system of government, and ﬁxing the several checks and controls
of constitution, every man ought to be suppose a knave, and to have no other end, in his
all actions, than private interest, Hume (1985)” —
makes one think that the optimal rules should be designed under the assumption
that all politicians are totally corrupt, not because they will be, but if we are protected
from the worst then we are protected from all.15 This idea would be correct only
15One of the authors, Geoﬀrey Brennan in a recent book, Brennan and Hamlin (2000), notes the
problems with that assumption and notes the importance of “economising on virtue” where he describes
his new position as “this marks a sharp departure from earlier writing... where the assumption of self-
17when such restrictions are costless. However tax rate constraints are costly in terms of
lowering public good level. Whenever candidates are not as corrupt as the designers of
the constitution assume, then tax rates prescribed by drafters will be set too low. 16
5 Legal Incentives.
When Sj stands for stealing, as it does in most parts of this paper, one anticipates
the possibility of legal punishment. Let us assume that a corrupt candidate believes
that with a small probability, p, he will get caught and even punished.17 When the
leader is caught in corruption, he will be deprived of his position and hence will lose the
legal rents, both w and E. Let us further assume that there is a legal penalty as well.
Although the details of the penalty depend on the laws of the country, in general it
involves some monetary penalty and imprisonment.18 The legal penalty for corruption,
we assume, is linear in the amount at rate stolen. There is also a ﬁxed component of
the penalty with monetary equivalent of −C. Thus, the expected rents that candidate
j receives when he is the leader is
R
p
j = W + E + 1{Sj>0}[LjSj − p(vSj + C + W + E)]. (10)
It is clear that with a suﬃciently strong legal enforcement, the problem of corruption
can be eradicated. For example whenever pv > 1, the expected gain from corruption
is deﬁnitely negative since in that case, Lj − pv < 0 for any Lj. Thus when the legal
incentives are high enough, no one will steal no matter what the electoral incentives
interested motivation is defended in the constitutional context.
16It is interesting to note the similarities between constitutional constraints projects by Virginia
school of public Choice and the regulation of a market. The previous analysis could be done with
politicians replaced with ﬁrms and drafters of constitution replaced with regulatory agencies. Yet,
regulating a duopoly is less diﬃcult, because it can be done through a “law” rather than a “constitution”
and there is a larger consensus on the motives of the ﬁrms .
17Note that we assume that the probability is independent of the amount the leader steals. It is
possible to imagine situations where stealing a great deal will increase (because of more attention)
or decrease (because the politician becomes very strong and can threaten or bribe) the probability of
punishment. One can ﬁnd a functional form where p = p(Sj) is an increasing/decreasing function,
without changing our results qualitatively.
18For instance, in the U.S., a public oﬃcial who has accepted a bribe shall be “ﬁned not more than
three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value or imprisoned for not more than ﬁfteen years







We assume that such strong legal incentives are not feasible due to administrative
and legal constraints.19
5.1 Equilibrium Under Law Enforcement.
Now the analysis of equilibria is more complicated owing to a discontinuity in the
objective function at Sj =0 , (see Figure 3). Theorem 1 no longer applies since it made
use of the continuity of reaction functions. In the appendix, we show, however, that
the reaction function under law enforcement, s
p
j(Sk), c a nh a v ea tm o s to n ep o i n to f
discontinuity. Accordingly, the reaction function looks like either Figure 4, or Figure 5.
19Increasing p is not easy, since auditing (or prosecuting) the leader is diﬀerent than, say, a tax
collector. Since auditing even tax collectors is not an easy task, we assume that for the leader there
is quite inadequate auditing, i.e., p is not zero, but is small. Given the weak auditing, what can be
done? One solution, known as Becker conundrum, is to have a low probability of detection, but a
very high punishment when the oﬀender is caught. It makes law enforcement eﬀective, despite the low
probability of detection. That quick ﬁx we think is not feasible either. In many countries, the legal
system itself is not very accurate and is subject to inﬂuence by the executive branch. To allow one
politician to be severely punished may deter not only corruption but also opposition. So we assume
that the system has a weak auditing mechanism that is very expensive to ﬁx, and that easy solutions






Owing to this discontinuity there can be multiple (two) equilibria. The conditions for
the existence of multiple equilibria for a general utility function are quite messy. Here
we provide these conditions only for our quasilinear example. When U = c +2 θ
√
G,











































The eﬀect of law enforcement on the point of discontinuity, e Sk, is clear: the higher
the law enforcement, K
p
j, the higher is e Sk. The eﬀect of uncertainty and relative ad-
vantage is as before: the higher 1
g or Pj the incentives for candidate j to steal is higher,
hence e Sk is lower. When e Sk, as calculated above, is negative for both candidates,
then the unique equilibrium always involves no corruption. When e Sk > 1f o rb o t h
candidates, the unique equilibrium involves corruption by both candidates. The nec-
essary and suﬃcient condition for multiple equilibria is e Sk <S
p
k(e Sj) for at least one
j ∈ {1,2} and k ∈ {1,2}\{j}. For the quasilinear example this condition is equivalent
to e Sk −
e Sj
2 < 1
4g + Aj. If this condition holds, the game has two equilibria (stay clean,
stay clean) and (steal, steal), where the second one Pareto dominates the ﬁrst one from









The comparative statics with respect to parameters in Lemma 1 are similar, i.e.,
the existence of legal incentives do not change the direction of electoral incentives. In
Section 5.3, we present comparative statics w.r.to penalties.
The legal incentives are important here in evaluating the eﬀect of higher wages and
the eﬀect of higher penalties on corruption and social welfare. In the following sections
we explain why this is so.
5.2 Wage reform.
As Persson and Tabellini [2000] observed higher ego rents imply lower political corrup-
tion.20 Although politicians who get higher ego rents from being leaders are good for
the voters, it is not clear how to ﬁnd such people and replace the current (and corrupt)
political elite with them.
After Becker and Stigler [1974], eﬃciency wages are proposed by many authors
in the literature as a solution to bureaucratic corruption. Wittman (1995) mentions
contractual solutions among the ways to solve the agency problem in democracies. Here,
we discuss the eﬀect of an increase in wages on Sj and on voters’ expected welfare.
Similar to ego rents, higher wages also makes winning the election more attractive,
and induce the agents to comply more with voter will. The advantage of increasing
20See Theorem 4.
21wages over increasing ego rents is that it is easier to increase the monetary compensation
than rents based on psychological factors. On the other hand, wage increases unlike
increases in ego rents, should be ﬁnanced from the public budget. Since, a clean
government may have a high cost in terms of high wages paid to the political agents,
one should calculate not only the eﬀect of wages on corruption, but also the net eﬀect,
including the eﬀect of wages on taxes and on public good levels. The total eﬀect of an













If we increase the wage candidate j receives, this will increase voter welfare only
when the beneﬁt of high wages (a decrease in Sj and hence an increase in Gj) is larger
than the cost of high wages (a decrease in public good due to higher wages). The
net beneﬁt from one candidate aﬀects voters’ welfare proportional to the likelihood of
that candidate winning the election. One implication of (11) is that whenever both
candidates are honest, increasing wages is always bad for voter welfare, since it does
not improve the quality of service, but instead, increases the cost of it.22 So when
one of the candidates is honest, increasing wages is not as eﬀective as when both are




Proposition 7 (i)When both candidates are identical, a small increase in wages in-
creases voter welfare if and only if
L − pv < 1 − p.
(ii) If the candidates are not identical, yet both steal in the equilibrium, then for a
small increase in wages to be welfare-increasing, a necessary condition is min{L1,L 2}−
pv < 1 − p,w h i l eas u ﬃcient condition is max{L1,L 2} − pv < 1 − p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The wage increases work in two channels. The “direct” eﬀe c ti st h a th i g h e rw a g e s
increase the rents from the oﬃce and hence the weight the candidate puts on voter
21See Appendix for the derivation.
22Here we disregard the possibility that higher wages will attract higher ability candidates to politics,
see Morelli and Caselli(2001) for a model of endogenously determined candidate characteristics.
22welfare goes up, inducing lower corruption. The “strategic” eﬀect, on the other hand,
works on the last part of (8): a rival candidate also reduces his corruption, ρj is now
lower, which further reduces the incentives to steal. Obviously the strategic eﬀect occurs
only when the rival candidate is also corrupt. An honest candidate cannot lower his
level of corruption. Hence, the prize (higher wages) are most eﬃcient inducing higher
compliance with voter will when both candidates are identical and corrupt, i.e., a1 = a2
and b =0 . 23
5.2.1 Comparing the reforms: Chicago versus Virginia.
When we have an increase in social welfare, the distribution of beneﬁts/costs of that
increase is also of interest. Let us compare the two reforms, higher wages and consti-
tutional constraints on tax rates, in terms of the burden they put on diﬀerent income
groups in society.
The two reforms will have diﬀerent eﬀects on the welfare of single individuals even
when the eﬀects on aggregate voter welfare is the same. The relative burden with tax
rate constraints is on the poor, since they pay a smaller share of the taxes compared
with the rich. The beneﬁt of the reform, i.e., relatively higher per capita public good,
is distributed equally among people.
In contrast, when wages increase, everyone pays the cost (higher taxes), but the
rich pay proportionally higher fraction. While the beneﬁt (higher public good level),
is also distributed equally. So for the same eﬀect on (aggregate) voter welfare, high
income voters would prefer the constitutional constraints and low income voters would
prefer the wage increases.
5.3 Small changes in penalties.
There is always pressure on politicians from the public and nowadays from multina-
tional organizations for harsher penalties on corruption. If in reaction to these pressures
some small steps are taken, how would the outcome be changed? The following propo-
sition considers the eﬀects of a small increase in either constant or variable components
of corruption penalties.
Proposition 8 As m a l li n c r e a s ei n
(i) constant penalty, C, leads to an increase in political corruption,
23In Appendix, we calculate the eﬀect of wages when one of the candidates is honest.
23(ii) variable penalty, v, reduces corruption only when the expected constant penalty
is less than the expected legal rents for a corrupt candidate, pC < (1 − p)(W + E).
Proof. By applying the implicit function theorem on (8)=0.
The intuition for (i) is that an increase in C actually reduces the expected rents
from oﬃce and hence reduces the weight politician puts on voter welfare. Then, the
marginal utility of stealing is higher for candidate j so Sj is higher in the equilibrium.
W eh a v et h es a m ee ﬀect for the variable penalty as well, i.e., lower rents from the oﬃce
as a result of higher penalties. But for the latter, there is another eﬀect that works in
the opposite direction, the higher the v, the lower is Lj −pv, i.e., the expected penalty
per dollar stolen increases. As usual, the result depends on the change in the relative
weights discussed in (8). If the decrease in the weight on voter welfare due to the ﬁrst
eﬀect is lower than the decrease in expected monetary beneﬁt of a dollar stolen, then
the second eﬀect dominates and the equilibrium level of Sj will be lower.
The constant penalty is good only if it is high enough to completely deter corruption.
Note that the condition for the eﬀectiveness of a variable penalty will be more diﬃcult to
hold when the constant penalty is higher. Thus, in our model, the constant penalty can
be justiﬁed only when it is suﬃciently high to completely deter the political corruption.
5.4 Political support for anti-corruption reform
We have seen that a suﬃciently large improvement in legal incentives will stop cor-
ruption. But such a reform needs to be proposed and implemented by politicians. An
interesting question, then, is whether politicians will support the reform. A utility-
maximizing politician should compare the beneﬁts and costs of the reform for himself.
Adding the reform to policy platform would increase his vote shares in current elections,
yet curbing corruption might reduce his current and future payoﬀs. Since the prob-
lem is a dynamic one and our model is static, we discuss this question only informally
here.24
Successful anti-corruption reforms, will be welcomed by the electorate. Yet, we have
corruption to begin with exactly because there is an agency problem: policies that the
electorate appreciates are not necessarily being implemented. If all candidates agree
not to propose the reform, it will never be implemented and the corruption among the
24Evrenk [2003b] oﬀers an analysis of this issue in a three-candidate setting.
24political leaders will continue.25 When both candidates are corrupt it is not diﬃcult
to see that if the illegal rents from corrupt status quo are signiﬁcantly high, then each
of the (corrupt) candidates would rationally choose not to propose the reform.
One may be inclined to think that this corruption trap is possible only when all the
politicians are corrupt. Since an honest politician receives no beneﬁt from the corrupt
status quo, he will incur no cost by supporting the reform. This reasoning is, however,
not always correct. Consider an honest leader, Candidate 1, who is going to compete
with a corrupt rival in the next election. An anti-corruption reform that will be prevent
all future corruption will aﬀect the policy platform of Candidate 2 in future elections.
It will induce Candidate 2 to oﬀer a more voter friendly platform. This will reduce
the honest candidate’s vote share. So, the honest candidate may also not propose the
reform. The intuition for this is that political competition is a zero sum game without
corruption, but this is not true with corruption. The existence of corruption beneﬁts
both candidates, even when one of the candidates is completely honest. When one
candidate is corrupt, he is better oﬀ, since he can get the illegal rents. The (honest)
competitor is better oﬀ because by stealing the candidate makes his policy platform less
attractive and hence the policy platform of his rival becomes more attractive. When
the choice to be corrupt is no longer available, the corrupt candidate is going to lose
his rents, but the honest one will lose some of his voters.26
5.5 Other approaches to agency problem in politics.
Adsera et. al. [2001] extend the incumbency model by Persson and Tabellini [2000].
They examine the incentives of incumbents to steal, given that voters have incomplete
information about the state of the world and support the incumbent whenever he
achieves a minimal performance standard. In their model, the minimum performance
standard is the expected utility from the challenger and is exogenous. As can be seen
in section 5.1, the strategic eﬀects, the change in the challenger’s performance as a
result of, say a change in wages, is absent when the performance of challenger is ﬁxed.
25Of course, the reform can be proposed and be implemented by people other than politicians, as
was the case in Italy with clean hands. But, eventually it is politicians who are going to control the
legal system and the law enforcement, so without their support such reforms may not be long lasting.
26When there are more than 2 candidates, there are even additional factors that determine the
location in the politcal spectrum and honest candidates’ support for the reform. Evrenk [2003b]
provides an analysis of this issue.
25Caselli and Morelli [2001] studied what determines the honesty and quality of elected
politicians. Unlike us, they allow the quality to be determined endogenously. But
in their model corrupt politicians do extract as much rents as they possibly can, i.e.,
there is no concern for reelection. The diﬀerence is mainly due to the fact that we
study competition among ﬁnitely many, actually two, politicians whereas they study
a continuum of politicians. In their model the large number of players reduces the
strategic incentives in rent extraction to zero. So, politicians either steal everything or
they do not steal at all. Our analysis diﬀers from both of these studies by modeling
the strategic interaction between candidates.
In his informal, but comprehensive paper, Kurer [2001] asks, “Why do voters sup-
port corrupt politicians?” He answers that it is either because the voters desire cor-
ruption or because there is no one else to support. The second case, he asserts, can be
the result of barriers to entry or factionalism or both.
6 Conclusion.
This paper has discussed possible reasons for the persistence of corruption in democra-
cies. We analyzed some commonly proposed reforms and show when, how and why they
may be useful. We also argued that politicians themselves may oppose anti-corruption
reforms. For the analysis, we use a static probabilistic voting model with heterogenous
candidates. We are planning to extend our analysis in following directions: (i) cam-
paign ﬁnancing, (ii) candidates with ideological motivations, and (iii) Principal-Agent
analysis when agent has authority over the principle.
In our model, the candidates steal for their own consumption which reduces their
vote shares. We also observe that when campaign ﬁnancing matters, candidates steal
(or have alliances with businesspeople who will steal when candidates win the elections)
to be able to raise money for campaign ﬁnancing. To look at the corruption as the
source of campaign ﬁnancing, one would require a diﬀerent model with voters who have
imperfect information.
A candidate can have strong preferences on policy on the one hand and use his
opportunities to steal on the other. The interaction of a candidate’s policy preferences
(on the tax rate and public good) and the amount he steals, as well as which part of
the policy platform he steals from, could shed some light on the relationship between
economic development and corruption.
26The design and implementation of legal incentives for politicians are not simple
applications of Principle-Agent theory. The Agent (candidate) has powers on the word
of the contract as well as its enforcement that is unimaginable in standard Principle-
Agent models. We believe that the analysis of the optimal contract as well as that
of optimal auditing structure (in terms of institutions) in that framework is worth
attention.
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7 Appendix
Lemma 3 When U(ci,G)=I(ci)+ H(G) with both I() and H() are strictly increasing,
C2 and concave functions from R+ to R with at least one of them being strictly concave,
the preferences of each voter is always single peaked in tax rates.
Proof. Note that under the above conditions, we have ∂2U
(∂τ)2 = YiI00()+(aj)2H00(.) <
0 which implies that the utility function is strictly concave in tax rate for any given
level of S. Then the local maximum is also the unique global maximum.
7.1 Vote shares.
Without knowing the personal preferences of each voter, a political candidate can not
know whether a speciﬁc voter is going to vote for him or not. What he can know is
that voter i will vote for the candidate 1 iﬀ U1
i >U 2
i which is equivalent to say,
bi2 <U(c1
i,G 1) − U(c2
i,G 2) − b − b2.




i,G 2)−b−b2]. If we sum this over Yi the expected vote share
of the candidate 1 is equal to
φ = 1
2 + f[E[U(c1
i,G 1) − U(c2
i,G 2)] − b − b2].
Since b2 is a random variable, φ is a random variable too. Candidate 1 is going
to win the elections and become the leader whenever φ > 1
2 or equivalently b2 <
28E[U(c1
i,G 1) − U(c2
i,G 2)] − b.
Using the distribution of b2,w eﬁnd that the probability of candidate 1 winning
the elections as a function of the policy platforms and the popularity of candidates is
1
2 + g[E[U(c1
i,G 1) − U(c2
i,G 2)] − b].
7.2 Voters’ Welfare
The voter i0s expected welfare is
ρE[U1
i |candidate 1 won the election] + (1−ρ)E[U2
i |candidate 2 won the election].
The expected value of bi2 conditional on candidate 2 winning the election is equal to
its unconditional expected value, which is zero. So the voters’ welfare can be written
as
ρ1Ui((1 − τ1)Yi,G 1)+(1 − ρ)Ui((1 − τ2)Yi,G 2)+( 1− ρ1)b
+(1 − ρ)Eb2[b2 | b2 < E[U(c1
i,G 1) − U(c2
i,G 2)] − b].
Note that the second part,
(1−ρ)Eb2[b2 | b2 < E[U(c1
i,G 1)−U(c2









4 − (ρ1 − 1
2)2]. Thus we can write the welfare of voter i as,










Summing (12) over i and using (4), we have the desired result,





7.3 First Best Policy Platforms
Lemma 4 The ﬁrst best policy platform for candidate j ∈ {1,2} is a platform that
maximizes the average utility of the electorate with zero corruption/shirking, i.e., (τo
j,G o
j)




∂τj ≤ 0 (with equality when τj < 1) and Go
j = aj(τo
j − W).
Proof. Note that given the optimal Sj we are able to pin down the optimal tax













∂Sj < 0, i.e., the voters’ welfare is maximum when Sj is minimum




∂τj ≤ 0 (with equality when τj < 1).
7.4 First order condition w.r.to Tax rate
To solve (5), candidate j should choose a tax rate such that the marginal utility of tax
rate for candidate j,
gRj
∂E[Ui((1 − τj)Yi,a j(τj − W − Sj))]
∂τj
(13)
is zero at τ∗
j.27 Since gRj is always positive, the ﬁrst order condition w.r.to tax
rate holds only when
∂E[Ui(τj,Sj)]
∂τj =0 . Thus, when maximizing his expected payoﬀs,
candidate j c h o o s e sat a xr a t et h a tm a x i m i z e sE[Ui(τj,S j)], the average welfare of
voters, for given corruption level, Sj. Then, when the candidate j does not steal/shirk,
the policy platform he chooses is optimal, τ∗
j = τ0
j.
7.5 Eﬀe c to fC o r r u p t i o no nT a xr a t e sa n do nP u b l i cG o o dl e v e l s .
Note that the f.o.c w.r.to tax rate does not directly depend on the policy platform of
candidate k.T h ee ﬀect of other candidate’s platform will be seen, if at all, through Sj.
When the candidate steals, i.e., S∗
j > 0, the tax rate he chooses is not necessarily
τ0
j. Using the implicit function theorem, we can calculate the eﬀect of a small change in






i U11+(aj)2U22] ∈ [0,1]. Figure 6 shows how Sj determines
τ∗
j for three diﬀerent utility functions, U.
The quasilinear utility functions determine the borders of the derivative: When I(.)
is linear, U11 =0 , we have
∂τ∗
j(Sj)
∂Sj =1 . Then the eﬀect of political corruption is socially
optimal public good levels, G0
j, but higher than optimal taxes. When H(.)i sl i n e a r ,
U22 =0 , we have
∂τ∗
j(Sj)
∂Sj =0 . In such case the tax rates are always optimal, candidate
steals from the public good. When both I() and H() are strictly concave the derivative
is between 0 and 1, and thus, the eﬀect of corruption is both lower than optimal public
good levels and higher than optimal taxes. The kinks in the ﬁgure that we encounter in
two quasilinear cases are due to the ﬁnite marginal utility at zero consumption. In such
case, the harm done to voters by stealing the last penny in the public budget or taking
the last penny of the taxpayer is not diﬀerent then stealing a penny from a large budget.











Thus, a candidate may ﬁnd it good policy to supply optimal public good yet impose
100 percent taxes. We rule out those “extreme” platforms, i.e., platforms that when
implemented voters have zero (public or private good) consumption, by assuming28 that
even in the quasilinear case29, the utility becomes strictly concave and the marginal
utility goes to inﬁnity around an epsilon neighborhood of zero consumption.30 Hence,
the strategy space relevant to our analysis, (τ∗
j(Sj),S j)i sac u r v ei nΣj, and its slope
28See page 5.
29The quasilinear form used both by Polo [1998] and Persson and Tabellini [2000], U = c + H(G),
does not satisfy that restriction. We also used quasilinear form in some of the exmaples, since it
makes calculations much easier. Since our model is more general, by this way we also show how their
results would change when other factors are included into the model. Both papers implicitly focus on
interior equilibria, where both candidates oﬀer lower than 100 percent taxes. We calculate the interior
equilibrium and specify the necessary and suﬃcient conditions on other parameters of the model for
interior equilibrium, when H(G)=2 θ
√
G..
30Let us provide an example for the other quasilinear form, U = I(c)+H(G)w h e r eH(G)=G.











G for G ≤
√
ε
for ε small enough the distance between H(G)a n dH
ε(G) is minuscule. Yet, as a result of this change,
a candidate never oﬀers zero public good, since oﬀering a little bit of public good increases voters’ utility
signifcantly. This example gives an idea of how to eliminate extreme positions in equilibria.
31is between zero and one.






, the Marginal utility of corruption for candidate j,( 8 ) ,
is continuous and strictly decreasing in Sj and continuous and strictly increasing in
Sk.






is continuous in both τj and in Sj. Similarly Rj(.) is also continuous in Sj. For the












∂Gj ↓ . The
arguments for Sk is similar, only simpler.
Corollary 9 The objective function, ρjRj is quasi-concave in Sj over (τ∗
j(Sj),S j).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 5.









j (Sk) > 0, we have (8) evaluated at (s0
j (Sk),S k)i se q u a lt oz e r o .





















where zjk = Ljak
∂E[U(ck
i ,Gk)]













1 ≤ 0. Thus both nominator and denominator is positive.
W h e n( 8 )i sn e g a t i v ea tSj = 0 then by continuity an inﬁnitesimal increase in Sk is
not going to increase the optimal Sj. Hence when s0




Proposition 10 Reaction functions s0
1(S2) and s0
2(S1) do not intersect more than once
in the interior, i.e., S∗
1 > 0,S∗




j is unique, if it exists.
32Proof. Assume that we have more than one interior equilibria. Then as Figure 7

















































∂Sj ≥ 1 ⇔
zjkzkj
4zjjzkk+Z ≥ 1w h e r eZ ≥ 0.
Using the deﬁnition of zjk from Lemma 6, we have






∂Sj ≥ 1 ⇔
zjjzkk
4zjjzkk+Z ≥ 1w h e r eZ ≥ 0. Contradiction.
Corollary 11 For later use note that the above result can be written as S∗
j > 0 and
S∗















Theorem 12 The pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the political competition game
exists and is unique.
Proof. Existence.






Then by the Theorem of Maximum the best response correspondence, s0
j (Sk)i sc o n -
33tinuous in Sk. No Extreme Platforms assumption implies that 0 6 s0
j (Sk) < 1. By
standard arguments there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Uniqueness.
-If there exists an interior equilibrum: By Proposition 10, if there exists an interior
equilibrium, then it is the only interior equilibrium. The continuity of reaction functions
with strategic complementarity implies that even a corner equilibrium where one of the







∂Sj = 0 (and even when both reaction functions have nonzero













1 holds for the interior equilibrium as well. Since the reaction functions are continuous







∂Sj ≥ 1, which is not possible by Proposition 10.
-If there exists a corner equilibrium: The same argument can be used to show






∂Sj < 1, then we can not have
any other corner equilibrium or interior equilibrium, since by continuity of reaction








7.7 The equilibrium outcome as a function of parameters of the game.
The condition that candidate j steals even when his rival does not, s0













j) − Pj. (CONDj)
Let ∆j := {a1,a 2,L 1,L 2,w,E,g,I(.),H(.):CONDj holds.}. When it holds, s0
j (0) >
0 is the point where the reaction function intersects the Sj axis. On the other hand
when s0
j (0) = 0, then we can deﬁne the point where the reaction function, s0
j (Sk)
intersects Sk axis. Thus, let Sk denote the lowest amount stolen by candidate k that
will not induce candidate j to steal, by continuity of reaction function it can also be
deﬁned as
Sk =i n f {Sk : s0
j(Sk) > 0}.








ajg[w + E + Ljs0
j(0)]H0(Gj(s0
j(0)). (INEQj)
Let Υj be the set of parameters such that the above condition is satisﬁed, i.e.,
Υj := {a1,a 2,L 1,L 2,w,E,,g,I(.),H(.):INEQj holds.}.
Let ω be the set of the parameters of a particular game.
Lemma 7 T h eu n i q u eN a s he q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m ei s :
(a) S∗
1 = S∗
2 =0 , iﬀ for all j ∈ {1,2}, ω / ∈ ∆j.
(b) a unique pair S∗
1 > 0,S ∗
2 > 0 iﬀ
-either for all j ∈ {1,2}, ω ∈ ∆j
-or ω ∈ ∆j, ω / ∈ ∆k with ω ∈ Υj.
(c) S∗
j = s0
j(0) > 0 and S∗
k =0iﬀ ω ∈ ∆j, ω / ∈ ∆k and ω / ∈ Υj.
Proof. Note that ω is either in ∆j ∪ ∆k or in (∆j ∪ ∆k)C. When ω ∈ (∆j ∪ ∆k)C
we have s0
j (0) = 0 for both candidates. Then none of them steals when the rival
steals zero. By Proposition 10 and by the continuity of reaction functions an interior
equilibrium is not possible either. Hence the unique equilibrium is zero corruption by
both candidates. If ω ∈ ∆j ∪ ∆k then it is either in ∆j ∩ ∆k or in ∆j\∆k. When it is
in ∆j ∩ ∆k both candidates are going to steal even when the rival does not, then by
Proposition 10 and by continuity of reaction functions, there exist a unique equilibrium
where both candidates steal positive amounts in equilibrium. If it is in ∆j\∆k then it
is either in ∆j\∆k ∩ Υj or in ∆j\∆k ∩ (Υj)C. When ω ∈ ∆j\∆k ∩ Υj by Proposition
10 and by continuity there only exist a unique interior equilibrium. The last case is ω
∈ ∆j\∆k ∩ (Υj)C. Now candidate k does not steal when candidate j steals s0
j(0) > 0.
Using Proposition 10 and continuity of reaction functions, we ﬁnd that in the unique
corner equilibrium only candidate j steals.
7.8 Analysis of Equilibrium Under Law Enforcement.
To start with let us deﬁne rj(Sj)=
(
Rj(Sj)f o rSj > 0
limSj↓0 Rj(Sj)a tSj
.
The function ρjrj(Sj) does not have any discontinuity. What we do is, to derive a
“fake” reaction function for candidate j, σj(Sk), from the optimization of ρjrj(Sj)a n d





σj(Sk)i fρj(σj(Sk),S k)rj(σj(Sk)) > ρj(0,S k)Rj(0) and σj(Sk) > 0.
0 otherwise.
Now, (8) = 0 is necessary but not suﬃcient for s
p
j (Sk) > 0 (although it is both
necessary and suﬃcient for σj(Sk) > 0).
The “fake” reaction function, σj(Sk), is similar to s0
j (Sk) in the sense that it comes
from the maximization of a continuous and strictly quasi-concave objective function
over a convex domain, hence it is single valued, increasing and continuous in Sk. Also
Proposition 10 can be applied to the intersection of σj(Sk)0s. It is this similarity that
we use to extend the results from the analysis with no law enforcement. Since we know
quite a lot about σj(Sk), let us try to understand when it is relevant. The following
Proposition shows that if it becomes relevant at some level of candidate k’s corruption,
it is always relevant for any higher level of corruption. By this proposition, s
p
j (Sk)c a n
have at most discontinuity and is strictly increasing in Sk as far as s
p
j (Sk) > 0.
Proposition 13 If ρj(σj(b Sk))rj(σj(b Sk)) = ρj(0, b Sk)Rj(0) for some b Sk with σj(b Sk) >
0 then
ρj(σj(Sk))rj(σj(Sk)) > ρj(0,S k)Rj(0) for any Sk > b Sk.
Proof. Take any b sk such that ρj(σj(b sk))rj(σj(b sk)) ≥ ρj(0,b sk)Rj(0). Let us note
that both sides are continuously diﬀerentiable in b sk and consider an inﬁnitesimal in-















∂Sk ]grj(σj(b sk)) + (Lj − pv)
∂σj(b sk)
∂Sk ρj > 0. We need to show















∂Sk ρj > 0













Since ρj(σj(b sk),b sk) < ρj(0,b sk),
ρj(σj(b sk))rj(σj(b sk)) ≥ ρj(0,b sk)Rj(0) implies that
rj(σj(b sk)) >R j(0). Hence A>0.
If the “fake” reaction function is always relevant for both candidates i.e., if for all
j ∈ {1,2} we have σj(0) > 0a n dρj(σj(0))rj(σj(0)) > ρj(0)Rj(0), then the discontinu-
36ity in the objective function has no eﬀect on the reaction functions, as shown in Figure
5. Then by the same arguments used in Proof of Theorem 1, the unique equilibrium
is S∗
1 > 0a n dS∗
2 > 0. When the fake reaction function is always irrelevant then the
best response is simply staying clean for whatever the rival does, hence the unique
equilibrium is no corruption. In those two cases, when σj(Sk)i sa l w a y sr e l e v a n ta n d
never relevant, we have unique equilibrium as in the no law enforcement case. On the
other hand the law enforcement does make a diﬀerence in some cases. There is a third
possibility that for both candidates σj(Sk) is sometimes relevant, i.e., an intermediary
case where ρj(σj(0))Rj(σj(0)) < ρj(0,0)Rj(0) yet there exists an e Sk ∈ (0,Sk)s u c h
that ρj(σj(e Sk))rj(σj(e Sk)) = ρj(0, e Sk)Rj(0). In that case the reaction function is dis-
continuous at e Sk. A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e6i ti sz e r ou n t i lSk = e Sk and then suddenly it
jumps to σj(e Sk) > 0. The diﬀerence is that now the game can have multiple equilibria,
one equilibrium where no candidate steals and another one where both steal. By an
application of Proposition 10, the interior equilibrium is unique, (the intuition is that in
the interior equilibrium it is the σj(Sk)0s that intersect each other, and as Proposition
























To simplify that let us note,
dE[Ui((1−τj(w))Yi,Gj(w))]






























Taking the derivative of ﬁrst order conditions and noting that the derivative of
∂E[Ui((1−τj)Yi,aj(τj−W−Sj))]
∂τj






























































∂S1∂S2 > 0 in the equilibrium. From here
it is easy to show that
dSj









7.9.2 Eﬀect of wages when only one candidate steals.

























Lemma 9 For any U,
If only candidate j steals in the equilibrium,
dSj
dW < −1 iﬀ Lj − pv <
1−p
[1+(ak
∂E[Uk
i (Go
k)]
∂G Áaj
∂E[Uj
i (G∗
j )]
∂G )]
.
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